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STUDENT COMMENTS
FEDERAL WATER POLLUTION LEGISLATION: CURRENT
PROPOSALS TO ACHIEVE MORE
EFFECTIVE ENFORCEMENT
Everyone wants clean water: the government, industry and
the people.—The American Paper Institute
Over the past twenty years Americans have become increasingly
concerned over the quality of their water. Each summer, as another
beach is closed or the water of another river turns a murky green,
greater pressure is placed on Congress to end this form of environ-
mental degradation. Since the enactment of the Federal Water Pollu-
tion Control Act of 1948 (FWPCA),1 each subsequent amendment has
sought to provide the missing link in water pollution legislation, and
each subsequent summer it becomes evident that more effective legis-
lation is necessary.
One of the most difficult tasks in drafting water pollution legis-
lation involves selection of the most appropriate method of control
from the myriad of scientific, technological and legal proposals. This
comment will examine the problems of achieving effective water pol-
lution enforcement by comparing existing law with the legislative al-
ternatives currently pending in Congress. Of these proposals, S. 2770,
a bill recently passed by the United States Senate,' would radically
alter the existing enforcement structure and, for this reason, it has
attracted a great deal of criticism. Another proposal, which contains
a similar approach to the problem, has been introduced in the House
of Representatives.' Although the Nixon Administration has not en-
dorsed either of these proposals, nor offered its own alternative,' it
has, nevertheless, indulged in a broad criticism of the Senate bill and
has made piecemeal suggestions for compromise legislation. In the
context of this legislative activity, the comment will consider the cru-
cial question of water pollution standards and their enforcement.
Through this analysis, it is hoped that the strengths and weaknesses
of the various pending proposals and suggestions will be disclosed. Fi-
nally, a summary assessment of the merits of each alternative will be
offered.
1 Ch. 758, 62 Stat. 1155 (1948 (codified at 33 U.S.C. i§ 1151 et seq. (1970)).
2 S. 2770, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971) [hereinafter cited as S. 2770].
a H.R. 11895 and 11896, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971) [hereinafter cited as H.R. 11895
& 11896]. For purposes of analysis, this comment will focus on the Senate proposals. Be-
cause of the similarity of the Senate and House bills, the criticisms and suggestions offered
in this comment will apply to both, except where noted.
4 Initially, the Administration submitted a number of bins to the Senate Subcommittee
on Air and Water Pollution, which subsequently reported out S. 2770. Since Senate passage
of the bill, the Administration has submitted no proposal in the form of legislation.
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I. THE STANDARD
Of vital importance in any water pollution legislation is the con-
trol standard thereby established. Such a standard not only provides,
by necessity, a definition of water pollution, but also indicates how
much pollution society will tolerate. Less abstractly, the standard is
the principal measure by which law enforcement officials distinguish
between the violator and nonviolator of the law. In the case of water
pollution, however, the standard itself is difficult to formulate because
its definition must be derived from legal as well as commercial, tech-
nological and social factors. An examination of the standards contained
in prior legislative efforts perhaps best illustrates the difficulty of es-
tablishing an appropriate water quality standard.
A. Prior Legislation and Its Inadequacies
1. The Prior Legislation
Until 1965 the principal federal source of water pollution con-
trol and enforcement was contained in the limited provisions of the
FWPCA of 1948. Under that Act federal enforcement authorities
could intervene only where a body of water had in fact been polluted
by the alleged polluter's discharges, and the pollution actually endan-
gered the health or welfare of persons in another state.' Consequently,
it was a difficult task for enforcement officials to sustain the burden
of proving that the polluter had polluted to the point of endangering
the public health or welfare. To avoid this undesirable situation, it
was suggested by experts that a water quality standard be adminis-
tratively imposed upon each body of water.° Any subsequent degra-
dation of the water below that standard would, it was argued, indicate
that a violation had taken place. In the water pollution amendments
of 1965 7 procedures were established which would achieve this goal.°
Since the 1965 amendments, the process of standard setting has
not been altered. The FWPCA gives each state the authority to set
its own water quality standards .° In doing so the state must adopt 1)
water quality criteria for interstate waters within the state, and 2)
a plan for implementation and enforcement of the criteria." If the
Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency (Administra-
tor) finds that the criteria "protect the public health or welfare, en-
5 33 U.S.C. § 1160(a)(1) (1970). For a general discussion of this judicial restriction
in similar subsequent legislation, see Barry, The Evolution of the Enforcement Provisions
of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act: A Study of the Difficulty in Developing
Effective Legislation, 68 Mich. L. Rev. 1103 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Barry].
6
 Barry, supra note 5, at 1111. In 1956, water quality standards were considered
together with other amendments to the FWPCA, but no new proposals were reported out
of Committee in either house of Congress.
7 Water Quality Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-234, 79 Stat. 903 amending 33 U.S.C.
§ 466 (1964) (codified at 33 U.S.C. § 1160(c) (1970)).
These provisions were codified in 33 U.S.C. § 1160(c) (1970).
' Id.	 1160(c)(1).
10 Id.
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hance the quality of water and serve the purposes of [the Act,] . . ."
they will be deemed applicable to the interstate waters within that
state.11
Where a state fails to comply with these requirements, however,
the Administrator must use a lengthy and cumbersome procedure, en-
compassing both an interstate conference and an administrative public
hearing, before he may promulgate federal standards." Once standards
are promulgated by a state or the Administrator, discharges which
violate them may be abated."
2. The Inadequacies of the Present 'Law
It is arguable whether the existing process of standard setting has
been successful. In the spring of 1971, the National Governors' Con-
ference collected the responses of governors from forty-seven states to
questions from the Senate Subcommittee on Air and Water Pollution
concerning the extent to which states have initiated their own water
quality standards." The survey revealed that all forty-seven states had
established water quality standards for interstate waters." The survey
also revealed that states which had not established standards for intra-
state waters were in the process of doing so." Although both interstate
and intrastate standards have been or are being established, environ-
mental groups have expressed disappointment over the lack of success
in establishing high standards of water quality and the "many incon-
sistent 'exceptions' " generally contained in state standards." They
argue that if standards are not stringent enough, they become "mere
licenses to pollute."'
Beyond these contentions, however, where water quality standards
have been set at a satisfactory level, two problems still remain: (a)
degradation and (b) detection and enforcement. Degradation occurs
where the actual quality of a body of water initially exceeds, or is
cleaner than, the established water quality standard, and subsequent
discharges lower the quality of the water to the standard. An industry
located on the banks of a trout stream could, for example, discharge a
considerable amount of pollution into the water, and hence cause con-
siderable damage before its discharge would violate the water quality
standard. In response to this problem, some states have included anti-
11 Id. § 1160(c)(3).
12 Id. * 1160(c) (2), (4).
18
 Id. II 1160(c) (5).
14 The Senate Subcommittee on Air and Water Pollution compiled the responses.
They may be found in Hearings on S. 75, S. 192, S. 280, S. 281, S. 523, S. 573, S. 601,
S. 679, S. 927, S. 1011, S. 1012, S. 1013, S. 1014, S. 1015, and S. 1017 Before the Subcomm.
on Air and Water Pollution of the Senate Comm. on Public Works, 92d Cong., 1st Sess.
at 1448 et seq. (1971) [hereinafter cited as Senate Hearings].
15 Id.
10 Id.
17
 Id. at 683.
18 Id.
751
BOSTON COLLEGE INDUSTRIAL AND COMMERCIAL LAW REVIEW
degradation clauses in their water pollution legislation . 19 These clauses
usually prohibit polluters from degrading the existing quality of the
body of water into which they are discharging.
With similar intent, the sponsors of the Senate bill included a
nondegradation clause in a group of amendments2° to the Water Quality
Act of 1965.21
 Advocates of this proposal, in addition to arguing that
the reduction of water quality from clean to seniiclean is a net loss
to the environment, also claimed that the absence of such a clause
would encourage industries to relocate on clean waters rather than
improve existing facilities on polluted streams." In spite of its ap-
parent benefits, the possibility of adding a nondegradation clause to
federal legislation has, however, attracted a substantial amount of
criticism. Critics argue that such a provision would stifle growth of
industry and force its movement away from urban areas, since it is im-
possible for a plant not to degrade a stream with high water quality."
It is also argued that antipollution programs ought to require that
industries located on an overburdened river should relocate on bodies
of water better able to handle their wastes and that nondegradation
provisions will discourage this decentralization." Still others contend
that a nondegradation clause would be acceptable only if exceptions
allowing for "legitimate water use" were made." Such exceptions
would include industrial as well as natural and recreational uses."
The second problem concerning the use of water quality standards
involves detection and enforcement. In particular, where several indus-
tries are located on a waterway whose water quality standard is vio-
lated, the difficult task of identifying the source of the pollution creates
additional problems. In this respect, the implementation of water
quality standards has additionally been hindered by the lack of an
effective monitoring system."
B. New Alternatives: Effluent Limitations and Federal Enforcement
The concept of effluent limitation has been offered as a logical
alternative to the water quality standards. Instead of indirectly mea-
suring discharges by their effect on water quality, monitoring equip-
ment would directly measure discharges at their source. As a result,
the effluent limitation standard has the distinct advantage of "pin-
pointing" the exact source of pollution. However, this type of standard,
like that of water quality, poses various problems.
19
 See id.
20 S. 523, 92d Cong., 1st Sess., § I0(b)(1)(B) (1971).
21 Pub. L. No. 89-234, 79 Stat. 903 amending 33 U.S.C. { 466 (1964) (codified at
33 U.S.C. § 1160 (1970)).
22 Barry, supra note 5, at 1122.
22 See Senate Hearings, supra note 14, at 756, 1071, 1116.
24 See id, at 1503.
2: IScle id. at 1088, 1117.
27 Id. at 647.
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I. General Problems
One group of critics sees effluent limitations as a "bottomless pit of
effort"28 :
Effluent standards can only be effective if there is no growth
or any change in any operating proposals and . . . no change
in the hydrology of the stream-flow or change in other charac-
teristics of the receiving bodies of water. None of these
premises are true in nature.29
In short, it is argued that effluent limitations can easily be rendered
ineffective by the constantly changing technological and environmental
factors surrounding them. However, it is questionable whether this
indictment of effluent limitations would hold true if the standards were
periodically reviewed and revised." This could be accomplished by
requiring the administrative agency responsible for promulgating the
limitations to review and make revisions of the limitations according to
a predesignated timetable. Such a procedure, however, would require
that the reviewing agency be kept informed of the latest technological
and scientific knowledge regarding water pollution abatement. Other-
wise, a certain amount of uncertainty might be injected into the
enforcement officials' task of applying effluent limitations:
An honest administrator cannot guarantee an industry or
municipality that if they build [a particular] type of installa-
tion . . . they will have no more problems from his organiza-
tion. This technical inability is a very discouraging thing for
the consulting engineers and State and local water pollution
control administrators, because they know that there is no
way to guarantee that the installation of a particular system
of controls will, in all instances, prevent any further problems
of waste control."
Thus it would seem that without an adequate research program, a
"technology gap" may result, rendering the effluent limitations too
unstable to enforce.
A related problem involving technology and effluent limitation
standards is the maintenance of standards, which should serve to
guarantee that present water quality will be enhanced or stabilized.
In fact this problem may become so troublesome that a state or federal
agency may find itself an unwitting accomplice in promulgating effluent
standards which are too low." Periodic review and revision of effluent
standards, as well as accurate, current knowledge as to the relation
20 Id. at 554.
29 Id.
80 Id. at 592.
31
 Id. at 554.
32 Id. at 561.
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between effluents and water quality are basic prerequisites in achieving
solutions to this problem.
2. Problems of Uniformity
Once the decision is made to change the entire basis for enforce-
ment from water quality standards to effluent limitations, a basic
determination must also be made as to whether such standards should
be uniform. Proponents of uniform standards claim that a lack of
uniformity would induce industries to locate in states with more favor-
able standards." This would, in turn, become an incentive for states
not to strengthen their effluent limitations since most states actively
encourage industrial concerns to locate within their borders. Supporters
of uniformity point to a state such as Maryland, in which state-based
plants have already relocated elsewhere as a result of tough water
standards, as an example of the dangers of nonuniform standards 8 4
Opponents of uniformity, the advocates of local standards, con-
sider fears of "community-shopping" to be unwarranted:
The decision of an industry to relocate is the result of a com-
bination of circumstances that results in an unprofitable or
noncompetitive situation. These circumstances include factors
such as changing markets, increased raw material costs or
freight rates, unfavorable tax rates, need to replace outdated
facilities or requirements for modernization, as well as other
circumstances."
However, this argument does not rule out the possibility that states in
which one or more of the above factors is only marginal may risk the
loss of a particular group of industries in enacting stringent effluent
limitations. Moreover, the argument does not acknowledge the situa-
tion where an industry, desiring to relocate, has found several states
in which the nonenvironmental factors are satisfactorily met. In this
situation, such an industry might well be tempted to choose the state
with the most flexible standards.
The localists also argue that uniformity leads to mediocrity. Thus,
in certain jurisdictions, such standards would tend to be too rigid and
restrictive, while in others they might be too general and permissive."
It is further argued that uniformity would penalize those states which
desire to have higher standards," and, on the other hand, that it would
be unnecessarily rigid in others "since some bodies of water, because
of their present quality, volume, flow, or other factors, have a greater
83 Id. at 376. See also a recent speech delivered by William D. Ruckelshaus, the Ad-
ministrator of the Environmental Protection Agency, advocating tough federal standards
to discourage states from using licensing as a means of attracting industry. 1 BNA Env.
Rep., Current Devs. 562 (Feb. 12, 1971).
84
 Id. at 612.
85
 Id. at 1088.
88 id. at 385.
87
 Id. at 385, 592.
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ability to cleanse themselves than do others!"aa Thus effluent limita-
tions, the localists conclude, should be based upon local needs and
characteristics rather than on a national norm.
3. The State-Federal Dichotomy
Beyond the decision of which type of standard Congress should
adopt, there remains the troublesome question of whether the state and
local governments or the federal government is to determine the stan-
dards. If one accepts the concept of uniformity, it would logically
follow that the federal government should set the standards, since its
national scope is more conducive to such a task. However, if standards
are to be uniform only within a state, or not uniform at all, a number
of alternatives to federal determination have been suggested. One
approach would allow states and localities to set their own standards.
Opponents of this proposal claim that the influence of industry on the
local level is so extensive that state participation would not be inde-
pendent enough to serve the public interest." Another approach advo-
cates the federal creation of strict guidelines within which the states
may set their own standards. This proposal, it is urged, would en-
courage the federal government to draw on the knowledge and re-
sources of state and local officials, and thereby foster state-federal
cooperation. The desirability of this cooperation would seem necessary
in light of the complexities of water control problems:
The diversity of water quality control problems existing
in the United States today pose [sic] problems that are not
amenable to the simple, generalized solutions that generally
flow from a centralized agency. State water quality control
agencies have acquired a background of information, experi-
ence and expertise in dealing with problems of their respec-
tive areas. This knowledge, experience and expertise should
not be bypassed by the Administrator. . . 4 °
Yet, it might be argued that this alternative is merely two steps away
from the direct imposition of federal standards.
The accusation has also been made that a federal enforcement
agency would set low standards, for political purposes.4' In order to
maintain a good rapport with wealthy industrial concerns, federal offi-
cials, it is posited, would attempt to balance the public and industrial
interests rather than to implement strictly the provisions of the water
control legislation. It has been suggested, therefore, that an indepen-
es Barry, supra note 5, at 1123.
89 Senate Hearings, supra note 14, at 612.
49 Recommendations to the House Public Works Committee on Amendments to
Federal Water Pollution Control Act, Advisory Task Force to the National Governors'
Conference, tit. III, at 1 (Nov. 15, 1971) (on file in the B.C. Intl. & Cora. L. Rev.
Office).
41 Senate Hearings, supra note 14, at 1081.
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dent organization such as the National Academy of Sciences set effluent
standards based solely on scientific and technical grounds 42
 This
suggestion, however, rests on some faulty analysis. First, although the
influence of industry on the activities of local levels of government
has been recognized, there is no proof that this same influence will be
exercised over federal water pollution enforcement. In addition, this
proposal ignores the fact that standard setting is often better left to
the agency responsible for enforcing the standards, since that agency
is probably the most sensitive in terms of judging their adequacy.
Enforcement procedures are not designed solely for the purpose of
prosecuting violators; they are also intended to induce conformity
with the law. Thus problems would also arise where an overly stringent
standard is set. Too strict a standard could impede this inducement
function since the risk of noncompliance might be less costly than con-
formity. Such a situation would also likely hinder effective enforce-
ment.
Serious questions of due process and equal protection could arise
if the standards are too stringent. If such standards were in force,
enforcement officials would only be able to prosecute violators selec-
tively, and the resulting discrimination and the imposition of judicial
restraint could lead to no enforcement at all. Consequently, considera-
tions such as these should compel enforcement officials to set standards
at a reasonable level.
One final alternative has been suggested which would place re-
sponsibility for regulation on both state and federal governments. This
proposal would permit the states to set effluent standards while the
federal government would establish water quality standards (assuming
that a combination of the two could be used).° On its face, this
proposal seems to be nothing more than an arbitrary compromise. The
probable effectiveness of federal-state cooperation should be based on
an evaluation of each level of government's knowledge, expertise and
ability to set standards. If the result shows that the federal government
is more qualified than the states, this fact should then be weighed
against the principle, traditionally embodied in this nation's water
pollution legislation, that water pollution is primarily a state responsi-
bility. Compromise would not only put standard setting into the hands
of the least capable officials, but also add to the confusion and over-
lapping that already exists.
C. The Senate Approach
The bill recently passed by the Senate, S. 2770, which would
amend the Water Quality Act, attempts to resolve many of the existing
problems by emphasizing effluent limitations. The bill declares that,
with few exceptions, the discharge of any pollutant by any person is
unlawful:"
42 Id.
" Id. at 741.
44 S. 2770, § 301(a), note 2 supra.
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[T]his legislation would clearly establish that no one has the
right to pollute—that pollution continues because of techno-
logical limits, not because of any inherent right to use the
nation's waterways for the purpose of disposing of wastes."
The bill would implement this policy with a two-phase program for
effluent limitations. Phase I would require that by 1976 effluent limita-
tions for point sources," other than publicly owned treatment works,
would demand the application of the "best practicable control tech-
nology currently available."' By 1981, the date set for the beginning
of Phase II, effluent limitations standards for the same sources would
require the complete elimination of pollutants from discharges." How-
ever, if it were found in certain cases that "no discharge" could not be
achieved at a reasonable cost, the bill permits that the "best available
technology" would be applied, taking into consideration its cost."
The bill also would provide for a system of "national standards of
performance" for new facilities, published by the Administrator,"
which would reflect an effluent reduction achievable by the particular
industry through application of the "best available technology." Where
practicable, the standard would permit no discharge of pollutants at
all.' The bill also exhibits a continuous concern for water quality. A
section provides for the revision of effluent limitations when it is found
that they would
interfere with the attainment or maintenance of that water
quality in a specific portion of the navigable waters.... [This
revision must] assure protection of public water supplies,
agricultural and industrial uses, and the protection and
propagation of a balanced population of shellfish, fish and
wildlife, and allow recreational activities in and on the
water. . .
45 S. Rep. No. 414, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 42 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Senate Report].
40 Point sources are defined as
any discernible confined and discrete conveyance, including but not limited to
any pipe, ditch, channel, tunnel, conduit, well, discrete fissure, container, rolling
stock, concentrated animal feeding operation, or vessel or other floating craft,
from which pollutants are or may be discharged.
S. 2770, * 502(p), note 2 supra.
47 Id. § 301(b) (1) (A) (i). To assist the Administrator in carrying out these objectives,
the bill would establish a self-monitoring system and give enforcement officials authority
to enter and inspect the facilities. Id. § 308(a) (4) (A).
48 Id. § 301(b) (2) (A) (i).
49 Id. In this area, the House bill can be distinguished from the Senate bill in one
major respect. The House bill requires that the determination of the "best practicable"
and "best available" technologies include consideration of the impact of world competition
on a particular industry. HR. 11896 & H.R. 11895 at § 304(b) (1) (B), note 3 supra.
This change represents a reaction to complaints by industrial leaders that effluent require-
ments might greatly increase prices, thus rendering domestic industry vulnerable to foreign
competitors not facing such requirements. See Senate Hearings, supra note 14, at 1079-80.
55 S. 2770, § 306(a) (1), (b) (1) (A), note 2 supra.
51
 Id. 4 306(a) (1).
62 Id. § 302(a). The Senate bill provides for a national "Water Quality Inventory"
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This concern with water quality is retained throughout Phase I of the
program, but dropped for Phase II," wherein effluent limitations are
based solely on technology." Phase I also would require conformity to
existing water quality standards while Phase II would not." These
provisions serve as an answer to those critics who claim that effluent
limitations callously disregard water quality. The provisions should
also eliminate the possibility of government-sponsored degradation of
water quality.
To prevent effluent limitations from becoming outdated as the
result of a changing commercial, technological and natural environ-
ment, the bill would provide that standards be reviewed and revised
at least every five years," and that the regulations concerning them
be reevaluated at least annually." To aid in this effort, the Adminis-
trator would be required to publish information regarding the types of
pollution and the methods available to abate them, as well as the cost
of such methods." If effectively coordinated with the research provi-
sions of the bill, this provision might aid in eliminating the uncertainty
inherent in enforcement. Industries and enforcement officials alike will
breathe easier if the effluent limitations and the methods of attaining
them have a high degree of reliability.
The Senate bill provides for uniformity of effluent limitations. As
noted previously, once the concept of uniform limitations is accepted,
it follows that the federal government would be more capable of setting
such standards. Therefore, the Administrator would be required to
promulgate regulations identifying, among other things, the degree of
effluent reduction attainable through application of the "best prac-
ticable" and "best available" technologies for categories of sources."
Although state participation would be somewhat limited in the area of
establishing standards, the states would not be precluded from assum-
ing a vital role in the control process. Local expertise is not completely
ignored, since the Administrator would be required to consult with
"appropriate Federal and State agencies and other interested per-
sons . . ."" before promulgating his regulations. It is questionable,
however, whether this language is strong enough, since no mention is
made as to what weight is to be given to a state's suggestions and criti-
cisms. In short, this language, depending on the Administrator's inter-
pretation, could provide the states with a meaningful role in the stan-
dard setting process, or could serve to ignore them almost completely.
to be taken, so that an accurate account of the quality of the nation's waters would be
available. See Id. § 305(b)(1)(A), (B), (C).
53 S. 2770, § 301(b) (2) (A) (i), 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971) [hereinafter cited as
S. 27701.
64 Id.
55 Id. §
50 Id. §
67 Id. 9
58
 Id. §
as Id. 1
00 Id. 9
301(b)(1)(C).
301(c).
304(b).
304(c).
304(b)(1)(A),
304(b).
(2)(A).
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Yet, the state which acts on its own would not be penalized. The bill
provides that "any more stringent effluent limitation, treatment stan-
dards, or schedule of compliance established pursuant to any other
State or Federal law or regulation . ."°1 would be complied with
during Phase I. Thus, even though the states would play a limited role
in the federal process, a state desiring higher standards could invoke
its local legislative and administrative machinery to accomplish this
goal.
D. The Administration's Approach
The Nixon Administration has, with reservations, indicated ap-
proval of several features of the Senate bill:
1. the 1981 "no discharge" objective, where feasible;
2. use of the best practicable technology by 1976, provided
that extensions of up to two years would be available;
3. use of precise effluent limitations for individual sources;
4. use of the best available technology for new sources 8 2
The Administration has, however, raised objections to other provisions
of the bill. Its chief criticism focuses on the almost exclusive attention
the Senate bill gives to effluent limitations.° The Administration has
proposed that the enforcement system be comprised of both effluent
limitations and water quality standards, with the former being partly
based on the latter:
In our view, the importance of effluent limitations cannot be
overestimated. It is our intention that these limitations, to
consist of clear descriptions of effluent quantity and quality,
will tell industries and municipalities in unambiguous terms
exactly what must be done to meet Federal requirements. We
expect these limitations to be the principal basis for future
enforcement actions."
Despite the fact that effluent limitations are not part of current federal
law, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) has used them to a
certain extent in issuing discharge permits and in conference recom-
mendations.° Thus enforcement officials, as well as legislators, have
Id § 301(b)(1)(C). See also id. § 510.
62 Statement of Russell E. Train, Chairman of the Council on Environmental Quality,
on Water Pollution Legislation Before the House Committee on Public Works on Dec. 7,
1971, 2 BNA Env. Rep., Current Days. 964 (Dec. 10, 1971).
68
 Statement of Russell Train, id. at 965. See also statement of William D. Ruckels-
haus, Administator of the Environmental Protection Agency, on Water Pollution Legis-
lation Before House Committee on Public Works on Dec. 7, 1971. Id. at 967.
64 Hearings on S. 25, S. 192, S. 280, S. 281, S. 523, S. 573, S. 601, S. 679, S. 927,
S. 1011, S. 1012, S. 1013, S. 1014, S. 1015 and S. 1017 Before the Subcomm. on Air and
Water Pollution of the Senate Committee on Public Works, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. at 19
(1971) [hereinafter cited as Senate Hearings].
06 Id. at 1834.
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already recognized the value of incorporating effluent limitations into
an effective water pollution abatement system.
Combining effluent limitations with water quality standards, as the
Administration suggests, is not an easy task. Its major problem is the
current unavailability of technological knowledge regarding the rela-
tionship of polluted discharges to water quality." In fact, this circum-
stance was one of the primary reasons given by the authors of the
Senate bill for eventually eliminating water quality standards and
basing effluent limitations entirely upon the availability of technology
in Phase II B7
 The Senate bill has directed itself to meet this problem
during Phase I by requiring the Administrator to develop and publish
criteria of water quality, "establish[ing] the effects of pollutants on
health or welfare, including the effects of pollutants on receiving water
ecosystems and man, and identifying] the natural chemical, physical
and biological integrity of the Nation's waters.""
The Administration concedes that difficulty exists in relating
effluent limitations to water quality, but it contends that the needed
knowledge will soon be developed." Therefore, despite admitted com-
plexity, the Administration would base effluent limitations on both
available technology and water quality." Somewhat quixotically, Ad-
ministration officials regard Senate efforts toward the ultimate use of
available technology alone, as the "renunciation of known complexity
on the altar of simplicity . . . the essence of bad government policy."'
The Administration also criticizes the Senate bill's Phase II
procedure, which would establish a "no discharge" standard, because it
provides for exceptions on a case by case basis only where costs would
be unreasonable." Instead, the Administration would fashion Phase IT
standards "on the basis of federally approved State or regional plans
which closely identify the full recreational, industrial and social poten-
tial for each river basin and which provide a meaningful schedule of
remedial measures to realize the potential."" There are two aspects to
this criticism. First, costs should be evaluated together with other
factors when the standards are first set. Second, the concept of cost
should include not only a consideration of the economic cost to indus-
try and government, but also a weighing of social and economic bene-
fits:
Without a consideration of the nature of the effluent, the
66 Statement of Russell Train, 2 BNA Env. Rep., Current Devs. 965 (Dec. 10, 1971) ;
statement of William Ruckelshaus, id. at 967.
67 See Senate Report, supra note 45, at 7-  8.
68 Id. at 49.
60 Statement of Russell Train, 2 BNA Env. Rep., Current Devs. 965 (Dec. 10, 1971) ;
statement of William Ruckelshaus, id. at 967.
70 Id
71 Statement of William Ruckelshaus, 2 BNA Env. Rep., Current Devs. 967 (Dec. 10,
1971).
72 Id.
78 Id.
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quality, nature and use of receiving water, and the costs to
society, we may be wasting resources which could be more
effectively used to clear the air, dispose of solid wastes, or
effectively address water pollution control in another body of
water. . . . The alternative uses of finite resources are in-
finite."
For the most part, the Administration's criticisms concern the
environmental cost of effluent limitations and their effect on water
quality; to a certain extent, the criticisms are valid. However, the
nature of the Senate bill mitigates the harshness of these criticisms by
providing that the Administrator, when promulgating effluent limitation
regulations, may specify factors to be considered in determining the
"best practicable' 75 or "best available" 78 technology that the Admin-
istrator deems appropriate. Thus the flexibility of the Senate bill would
permit consideration of the factors suggested by the Administration.
It is this flexibility which makes the Senate bill the most viable alterna-
tive in the area of standards, and it is this same feature, although some-
what more limited, which recommends the bill in the area of enforce-
ment.
IL ENFORCEMENT PROCEDURES
Standards alone, of course, do little to abate water pollution; to
be effective, they must be accompanied by a meaningful system of
enforcement procedures. Traditionally, federal water quality enforce-
ment has been effected by means of two separate programs: adminis-
trative action and a refuse permit system. The Senate proposal
represents a substantial effort to revise these two programs and to
combine them in the Federal Water Pollution Control Act (FWPCA).
As in the case of standards, practical and legal considerations, as well
as the state-federal dichotomy have raised difficult questions and have
complicated immeasurably the task of reform.
A. Administrative Action
Administrative action has been used as an enforcement method
since the original water pollution legislation of 1948. It involves the
procedure which takes place during and after the alleged polluter is
detected, but before he is prosecuted in a court of law. The purpose of,
such a procedure is to gain compliance with the law and to avoid the
costs and delays of litigation.
1. Existing Law
Present federal law provides for a three-stage administrative
process. At the first level," the Administrator may call a conference
74 Id. at 967-68.
75 S. 2770, § 304(b) (1)(A), note 53 supra.
75 Id. § 304(b)(2)(A).
77 33 U.S.C. 1 1160(d) (1970).
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comprised of representatives of state and interstate agencies if one of
four conditions is met:
a) If a conference is requested by a Governor of any State, a
State water pollution control agency, or the governing
body of a municipality (with the consent of the Governor
and State Water Pollution Control Agency of the State
within which the municipality is located), referring to
pollution endangering the health and welfare of persons
in a state other than where the discharges originated. 78
b) If a conference is requested by the Governor of a State
referring to the pollution of navigable or interstate waters
within the State, unless the pollution is not sufficient
enough to exercise federal jurisdiction."
c) If on the basis of a study, report or survey, the Adminis-
trator has reason to believe any pollution referred to in
(a) is occurring."
d) If the Administrator finds that the interstate shellfish
industry is being substantially injured economically by
pollution referred to in (a).81
At the conference, the alleged polluter and those affected by the
pollution are given an opportunity to present their views.' The con-
ferees also have the power, by majority vote, to require the purported
violator to file a report containing "such information as may reason-
ably be requested as to the character, kind, and quantity of such dis-
charges ... by the person filing such a report."" Failure to file such a
report makes an alleged pollutor liable for a civil penalty, recoverable
in an action brought by a United States Attorney. 84
After the conference, if the Administrator believes "that effective
progress toward abatement of such pollution is not being made and
that the health or welfare of any persons is being endangered. . . "85
he can recommend to the proper state water pollution agency that
abatement action be taken." If the State agency does not comply
within six months, the second stage of enforcement must be instituted:
the public hearing." The hearing, called by the Administrator, differs
from a conference in the following ways:
a) the hearing is adversary in nature; 88
78 Id, § 1160(d)(1) (1970).
7° Id.
80 Id,
81 Id.
82 Id. § 1160(d)(3) (1970).
82 Id. § 1160(k)(1) (1970).
84 Id. § 1160(k)(2), (3)	 (1970).
85 Id. § 1160(e) (1970).
88 Id.
87 Id, § 1160(f)(1) ( 1970).88 See 18 C.F.R. § 606.4(d), .9, .10 (1970).
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b) membership is comprised of representatives of federal de-
partments as well as those from state agencies;"
c) the Hearing Board, rather than the Administrator, makes
findings and recommendations;" and
d) the Administrator has the discretion to require the alleged
polluter to file a report 9 1
After the Board has made its findings and recommendations, the Ad-
ministrator must convey them to the alleged polluter and must give him
at least six months to comply."
If there is no compliance within the specified period, the third
stage is initiated: litigation 98 Where pollution is discharged in one
state and is affecting another, that is, its effects are interstate, the
Administrator may request the Attorney General to bring an action to
secure abatement." However, in the case where pollution is only affect-
ing the state in which it is discharged, the Administrator may request
the Attorney General to take appropriate action only upon the written
consent of the Governor of that state." Thus the state retains a certain
amount of veto power over actions taken against polluters whose
violations do not extend beyond its borders. It is questionable whether
this veto power is justified in the light of water pollution abatement
goals. Although the rights of state enforcement agencies should be
recognized, the failure of the latter to exercise those rights should be
resisted. Where a state has failed to act because of the influence of
industry, its reluctance should not be permitted to bind the federal
government in its effort to provide citizens relief.
The foregoing cumbersome procedure represents a slavish alle-
giance on the part of Congress to a policy which was intended to
encourage the states to take responsibility for water pollution control."
It comes as no surprise that under this procedure only one case has
reached the litigation stager and only a few have gone beyond the
conference stage.°8 It must be emphasized, however, that the problem
with existing federal procedure is not merely the policy of state re-
sponsibility. States should be given every opportunity to develop
enforcement systems of their own. However, once a violation has oc-
curred and a state fails to act, the federal government should be able
to act swiftly to take the necessary abatement action99
89 33 U.S.C.	 1160(f)(1) (1970).
90 Id.
01 Id. § 1160(f)(2) (1970).
92 Id. 0 1160(f)(1) (1970).
98 Id. § 1160(g) (1970).
94 Id. 11160(g)(1) (1970).
95 Id. § 1160(g)(2) (1970).
90 Id. § 1160(b) (1970).
97 See statistics in 41 BNA Env. Rep., Fed. L. 5201 et seq. (1971).
08 See id.
99 See the President's 1971 Environmental Message to Congress, summarized in 1
RNA Env. Rep., Current Devs. 1097 (Feb. 12, 1971); Senate Hearings, supra note 64,
at 20.
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A step in the direction of immediate federal enforcement was
taken in the 1965 Amendments.10° If a discharge violates water quality
standards, the Administrator may, as a result of the 1965 Amend-
ments, request that the Attorney General bring an action of abatement,
provided that the Administrator gives notice to the polluter and to
other interested parties six months before the action is commenced.'
Although six months' notice is required, the time period is significantly
shorter than the possible years of delay inherent in the regular pro-
cedure. The provision contains one limiting feature, however; it applies
only to discharges made into "interstate waters," and not "navigable
waters."
Historically, in cases dealing with the Commerce Clause, the
United States Supreme Court has defined "interstate waters" as in-
cluding "navigable waters" and their tributaries, as well as waters
which flow across state boundaries.' Prior water pollution law has
explicitly stated that its enforcement provisions are applicable to all
bodies of water included in this broad definition." However, the six
months' notice provision stands as an exception to this general rule,
since the language of the section in which it is contained limits its
use to "interstate waters" in the narrow sense of the term.'" Although
the Environmental Protection Agency has expressed a preference for
using this provision rather than an action under the permit system,'
this administrative procedure presents certain difficulties, discussed
in the subsequent section.
2. The Senate Approach
The Senate bill eliminates these cumbersome conference and hear-
ing procedures, since such procedures "would serve no purpose except
delay in an enforcement program based on effluent limitations. ""°8 In-
stead, the bill would vest the states and the federal government with
"concurrent" powers of enforcement.' Thus each state would be given
the opportunity to develop its own administrative enforcement pro-
gram. If the program met certain requirements enumerated by the bill,
the Administrator would approve the program and allow the state to
assume the responsibility of enforcement. Once a state's effluent limita-
100 Water Quality Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-234, 79 Stat. 903 amending 33 U.S.C.
§ 466 (1964) (codified at 33 U.S.C. § 1160 (1970)).
101 33 U.S.C. § 1160(c)(5) (1970). Of course, where the Attorney General must
receive the consent of the state, he must obtain the Governor's permission before pro-
ceeding. Id. § 1160(g) (2) (1970).
102 See The Daniel Ball, 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 557 (1871) ; United States v. Rio Grande
Darn & Irrigation Co., 174 U.S. 690 (1898).
101 33 U.S.C. § 1160(a) (1970).
104
 Compare id. with id. § 1160(c) (5) (1970).
105 See EPA Guidelines on Water Pollution Enforcement, set forth at 2 BNA Env.
Rep., Current Devs. 562 (Sept. 10, 1971).
100 See S. Rep. No. 414, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 64 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Senate
Report].
107 id.
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tions enforcement program has been accepted by the Administrator,
the condition precedent to any federal action would be a failure to act
on the part of the state.
The bill provides for two courses of federal action. First, if the
Administrator should find "on the basis of information available to
him" that any person is violating effluent standards, he must give thirty
days' notice to the alleged violator and the state in which the violation
occurred.1" If the state failed to "commence appropriate enforcement
action" within thirty days, the Administrator could issue an order to
comply or bring a civil action for relief."' A second course of action
available to the Administrator would be invoked where he "finds that
violations of applicable effluent limitations . . . are so widespread that
[they] appear to result from a failure of the State to enforce ... effluent
limitations effectively . . . .""° His finding would be made public if the
state's noncompliance extended beyond thirty days,'" and the period
from the date of public notice until the state "satisfies" the Adminis-
trator that it will enforce the limitations is designated as a period of
"federally assumed enforcement." 112 During this interval the Adminis-
trator would enforce any applicable effluent limitation by issuing an
order or bringing a civil action.'"
a. The State-Federal Dichotomy.—In the Senate report, the
authors of the bill unequivocally reiterated the principle of state re-
sponsibility:
The Committee intends [that] the great volume of enforce-
ment actions be brought by the State. It is clear that the Ad-
ministrator is not to establish an enforcement bureaucracy but
rather to reserve his authority for the cases of paramount
interest.'
Unfortunately, in its efforts to reconcile the principle of state responsi-
bility with the practical necessity of utilizing the federal enforcement
ability, the Senate has ignored an important practical situation. That is,
the fifty states are not easily separated into two categories: those ready
and willing to enforce effectively and those that are unwilling or unable
to enforce. This simple categorization overlooks a large number of
states which inadequately enforce the law. The bill permits the Ad-
ministrator to act if a state took no action at all.' If, however, the
state commenced "appropriate enforcement action," no matter how
"a S. 2770, * 309(a)(1), 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971) [hereinafter cited as S. 2770].
109 Id.
no Id. § 309(a)(2).
111 Id.
112 Id.
118 Id. § 309(a)(2)(A), (B). The bill also provides that any order issued by the
Administrator and not complied with may be enforced by a civil action. Id. § 309(b) (1).
114 Senate Report, supra note 106, at 64. The bill also enunciates this principle in
its statement of policy. S. 2770, § 101(b), note 108 supra.
116 S. 2770, § 309(a) (1), note 108 supra.
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inadequate in the context of the entire enforcement process, the Ad-
ministrator's hands would be tied. For example, a state might give a
polluter an over-extended time in which to comply or file a complaint
in court and then take no action on the problem. In both of these
instances, "appropriate action" may have been commenced, yet the
Administrator apparently would be powerless to intercede if the action
were initiated, but not pursued.
The Administrator could use the power given to him by another
provision of the bill to revoke his approval of the state enforcement
program and to render it inoperable."' However, this procedure would
be extremely cumbersome, especially since the Administrator would
have the burden of proving the entire program inadequate. In addition,
if only one or a few violations were involved in the controversy, attack-
ing the entire system of enforcement might be highly impractical. It is
possible that if the state procedure continued in regard to a number of
polluters, the Administrator could create a period of "federally as-
sumed enforcement" under the bill.'" In such a situation, there is a
danger that federal and state officials could waste valuable time arguing
as to whether the state had sufficiently enforced the provisions of the
act. This entire process is clearly cumbersome and unnecessary.
A major criticism of existing law, as noted earlier, has been that
federal enforcers should be allowed to abate a violation where the state
has failed to do so."' A wiser alternative to the Senate approach would
be to grant the federal government this power, unconditioned by any
state efforts. Although the Senate bill has not adopted this approach in
regard to effluent limitations, it has done so for purposes of enforcing
the provisions dealing with "national standards of performance" and
"monitoring systems."'" Thus to ease this potential state-federal con-
flict it would only be a matter of conforming the effluent limitations
provision to this same approach.
It will, of course, be argued that allowing the federal government
unconditional enforcement power with regard to effluent limitations
will both violate the rights of those states which are willing and able
to enforce them and, at the same time, cause a great deal of overlap-
ping."' In practice, however, this will not occur. The Administrator's
primary task is to abate pollution, not usurp states' rights. As a prac-
116
 Id. § 402(c)(3).
117
 Id. § 309(a)(2).
118 See text accompanying note 99 supra.
119 S. 2770, § 309(a)(3), note 108 supra.
120 Hearings on S. 75, S. 192, S. 280, S. 281, S. 523, S. 573, S. 601, S. 679, S. 927,
S. 1011, 5.1012, S. 1013, S. 1014, S. 1015 and S. 1017 Before the Subcomm. on Air and
Water Pollution of the Senate Comm. on Public Works, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. at 384, 548
(1971) [hereinafter cited as Senate Hearings]; Barry, The Evolution of the Enforcement
Provisions of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act: A Study of the Difficulty in
Developing Effective Legislation, 68 Mich. L. Rev. 1103, 1118 (1970) [hereinafter cited
as Barry]. The argument has also been made that those subject to the law will completely
bypass the state and look to the federal government since it would be the ultimate
authority. Senate Hearings, supra, at 544.
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tical matter, effective enforcement on the states' part would leave the
Administrator more free . to confront the numerous other problems
which water pollution creates. At the same time, this approach should
serve as an impetus to the states to develop effective enforcement pro-
grams in order to avoid federal intervention 121
b. The Elimination of Administrative Procedure.—Another criti-
cism of the Senate bill has questioned the validity of the premise that
notice followed by court action is the best method of enforcement. The
authors of the Senate bill may be correct in their determination that
existing law may require too much procedure, but the superfluity of
procedure does not justify their eliminating the entire range of admin-
istrative remedies. The absence of at least one administrative hearing
or conference may have two negative effects. First, it may mean the
loss of a valuable enforcement tool against the consumer-conscious
polluter. Frequently, a public hearing with its accompanying publicity
serves as a strong—perhaps even stronger than the threat of litiga-
tion—incentive for such a polluter to comply with the control standard.
Furthermore, in reality, pollution enforcement is rarely achieved by a
simple reminder of the statutory limitations. Rather, enforcement is a
complex procedure through which methods and schedules of com-
pliance are mapped out.' In light of the practicalities of the situation,
it would seem that the enforcement official would have a great deal
more control over the outcome in a conference proceeding than if the
matter were adjudicated. Enforcement officials might also find it diffi-
cult to implement an overall plan for the several polluters of a specific
body of water, since judicial decisions are often inconsistent from
case to case and jurisdiction to jurisdiction.
The necessity of retaining the conference stage also seems advis-
able in light of the inefficiency of the American judicial system. Full
scale litigation consumes a great deal of time and expense for both the
enforcer and the violator. The enforcer might be prone to ignore small
or marginal polluters for this very reason. Moreover, with the threat of
enforcement litigation so slight, there would be little incentive for the
small polluter to conform to effluent limitations. On the other hand, if
the small polluter were prosecuted, he might, for litigation purposes, re-
sort to funds that could be used for the purchase of needed abatement
equipment. Assuming that the purpose of this legislation is to eliminate
water pollution rather than to punish wrongdoers, exhaustion of a
polluter's funds through litigation would be an undesirable result.
Although the value of the in terrorem effect of litigation as a
bargaining tool is well recognized,' this enforcement tool alone is
inadequate. What is needed to fill the void is a procedural vehicle, such
as a statutorily required conference, through which the Administrator
121 Statement of William Ruckelshaus, 2 BNA Env. Rep., Current Devs. 968 (Dec.
10, 1971).
122 See Senate Hearings, supra note 120, at 69.
122 The use of injunctions and temporary restraining orders, where appropriate, also
must not be overlooked. See the provisions of S. 2770, * 309(b), note 108 supra.
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and the alleged polluter may bargain.'" Obviously, it is desirable for
the Administrator to be empowered to abate violations without cumber-
some procedural requirements in emergency situations, and under a
separate provision of the bill he would have this power.' 26 In this way,
effective solutions could be obtained without incurring the cost and
perils of litigation.
B. The Permit System
The permit system applies, in effect, a very common form of
governmental regulation to the water pollution problem. By requiring
a polluter to obtain a permit before discharging into a body of water,
the system accomplishes two objectives: it notifies the enforcement
officials of the polluter's presence, and it informs the polluter of his
obligations. A permit system also vests the enforcement official with
a certain amount of control over previolation behavior in the conditions
he may impose on the permit. Furthermore, the official's efforts may
extend over a broad range of pollution activity since an entire class or
category of industries may be treated at the same time. Despite these
advantages, there is the potential danger that permit conditions may
be set too low. In such a case, a permit loses its enforcement qualities
and becomes merely a legal permission to pollute."'
1. The Existing Law
The present federal permit system is totally unconnected with the
Water Pollution Control Act; rather, it finds the source of its authority
in the Refuse Act of 1899.127 Until 1970, when it was revised through
an Executive Order, 128 the Act existed relatively unknown to enforce-
ment agencies. Generally speaking, its provisions prohibit the dumping
of refuse by any person into any body of water, with the one exception
of liquid waste from streets and sewers. 12° Since the Refuse Act was
enacted during the last century, it is questionable whether Congress in
1899 intended to include the modern conception of pollution in the
124 As William D. Ruckelshaus, Administrator of the EPA, stated in a letter to the
Senate Subcommittee, "a face [sic] finding forum . . . [may provide] a necessary pre-
requisite [in certain kinds] of court actions." Senate Hearings, supra note 120, at 69.
125 5. 2770, § 504, note 108 supra.
126 Senate Hearings, supra note 120, at 377.
127 33 U.S.C. § 407 (1970).
128 Exec. Order No. 11,574, 3 C.F.R. 188-189 (1970)
122 33 U.S.C. § 407 (1970).
The Act prohibits the discharge of refuse into both navigable and nonnavigable waters,
but requires permits to be issued only in the case of discharges into navigable waters. 33
U.S.C. § 407 (1970). Since 1899 the courts have widened federal jurisdiction to include
tributaries of navigable waters as well, in order that down stream navigability might be
protected. See p. 764 supra. The Army Corps of Engineers has followed suit by including
nonnavigable tributaries within the scope of the system. 36 Fed. Reg. 6564 at seq.
§ 209.131(a) (1971). [The permit regulations took effect on April 7, 1971, and will be
codified in 33 C.F.R. § 209.131. Citations will therefore be made to section numbers as
they appear in the Federal Regulations, supra, and as they will appear in the Code of
Federal Regulations.]
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term "refuse." The Act was seemingly directed toward the problem
of navigation, and with this as its goal it is highly likely that the term
"refuse" was intended to describe debris which would obstruct naviga-
tion. However, throughout this century, the courts have given the term
a liberal interpretation,"° making it a "catch-all" applying to "matter
of any kind, whether or not commercially valuable."'"
a. Operation of the Permit System.—Administratively, the Ref-
use Act provides that the Secretary of the Army shall enforce its provi-
sions, but the Act itself sets forth no standards to aid in the process. 18"
Consequently, the Army Corps of Engineers (Corps) has, pursuant to
this authority, promulgated regulations which constitute the federal
permit system.'" These regulations declare all discharges, unless an
exception applies, to be unlawful without the authorization of a
permit."' In issuing a permit, the Corps will consider several criteria:
1. anchorage and navigation;
2. water quality standards and related factors; and
3. fish and wildlife values not covered by water quality
standards .186
In regard to the issuance procedures, the EPA plays a significant
role in the permit-issuing process by advising the Secretary of the
Army, concerning a) the meaning and content of applicable water
quality standards; b) the impact of the proposed discharge on water
quality; c) permit conditions required in order to comply with water
quality standards; d) permit conditions necessary to carry out the
FWPCA when water quality standards do not apply; and e) recom-
mendations as to what the duration of the permit should be."° The
EPA's influence is not, however, limited to its advisory position. The
regulations also require that the Secretary accept the conclusions of the
Regional Representative of the EPA that a potential permittee's dis-
charge adversely affects water quality standards unless such con-
clusions are not supported by specific findings.'" Since no permit may
be issued which is inconsistent with these conclusions, 188 it would
certainly appear that the EPA effectively controls much of the permit-
issuing process.
Like the EPA, the states may also exercise some influence in the
permit-issuing process. Thus, before a permit may be issued, the state
180 For a discussion of the cases see Comment, The Refuse Act of 18991 Its Scope
and Role in Control of Water Pollution, 58 Calif. L. Rev. 1444, 1448-52 (1970).
181 Id. at 1451.
182 See 33 U.S.C. § 407 (1970).
188 36 Fed. Reg. 6564 et seq. § 209.131 et seq. (1971).
184 Id. at § 209.131(d) (4). The maximum duration of a permit is five years. Id. at
§ 209.131(N).
188 Id. at § 209.131(d)(5).
186 Id. at 1 209.131(d) (7 ).
187 Id. at § 209.131(d)(8), (9).
288 Id. at § 209.131(d)(10), (11).
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in which the applicant is located must certify that the issuance of such
a permit will not have an undesirable effect on the state's water
quality.'" However, if the state does not exercise its right within a
reasonable time, the certification is waived.'"
Beyond identifying the participants who are involved in the pro-
ceedings, the regulations contain additional procedural requirements.
Notice 41 is to be given and a public hearing held a) whenever in the
opinion of a District Engineer it would be advisable to hold a hear-ing; 192 I- •D) when an affected state objects to the issuance of a permit
and requests a hearing; 148 or c) when the Secretary proposes to sus-
pend a permit where it violates water quality standards."'"
b. An Assessment of the Permit System.—To date the permit
system has achieved limited success, with approximately twenty per-
mits issued nationally.'" The reason for such a small number lies more
in the administrative inadequacies of the system than in any lack of
initiative on the part of enforcement officials.'" Factors such as incom-
plete applications, the invariable delays in state certification, and the
necessity of designing complicated schedules for compliance as pre-
conditions to the issuance of each permit may have caused much of the
delay."7
 In addition, the relative novelty of the system may be a factor
in its limited application; each time an existing enforcement procedure
is modified or a new one is instituted, the change engenders a great
deal of shifting of personnel and restructuring of operations, both of
which increase delays and costs in the licensing procedure.
Besides these internal difficulties, a recent federal court decision,
Kalur v. Resor, 148 seriously hampered the system's procedure; it
held that an environmental impact statement must accompany each
permit application. In its decision, the district court embraced a strict
interpretation of the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA).""
That Act requires that in every "major Federal action . • . signifi-
cantly affecting the quality of the human environment . . . [there must
be included] a detailed statement ... on . . . the environmental impact
of the proposed action.'n" By its ruling the court has extended the
principle of Calvert Clif s' Coordinating Committee v. Atomic Energy
150 Id. at { 209.131(h).
140 Id. at § 209,131(b)(3). The states have been given certification authority by
the 1970 Amendments to the Water Pollution Control Act. 33 U.S.C. § 1171(b) (1970),
amending 33 U.S.C. § 1171 (1964).
141 36 Fed. Reg. 6564 et seq. § 209.131(j) (1971).
142 Id. at § 209.131(k) (I).
143
4 Id .
 a
 t	
209.131(k) (5).
4 Id.
145 Chicago Tribune, Dec. 30, 1971, § I, at II, col. 4.
146 Statement of Lieutenant General F. J. Clarke, Chief of Army Corps of Eng'rs,
2 BNA Env. Rep., Current Devs. 795 (Nov. 5, 1971) .
147 See id. and 2 BNA Env. Rep., Current Devs. 369 (July 30, 1971).
145 Civil No. 1331, 3 E.R.C. 1458 (D.D.C., Dec. 22, 1971).
140 42
	 H 4331 et seq. (1970).
15° Id. § 4332(C)(i).
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Commission"' which held, in part, that the Commission must inde-
pendently consider the impact that nuclear power plants might have
upon water quality. The Kalur court took Calvert Clif s' one step
further by holding that the impact statement which NEPA requires
applies not only to water quality determinations but also to "environ-
mental improvement agencies," such as the Army Corps of Engineers,
which had previously deferred to assessments made by the EPA. 152
While previous cases bad recognized the Secretary's authority to
consider environmental issues before issuing a permit,' it was as-
sumed that express conformity with NEPA impact statement require-
ments was unnecessary with respect to EPA consultations. Similarly,
another provision of NEPA declares that the duty to file an environ-
mental impact statement does not affect the obligations of a federal
agency to a) comply with environmental quality standards; b) consult
with any other state or federal agency; or c) refrain from acting on
the basis of recommendations of any state or federal agency.'" The
petitioner contended that although this judicial and statutory authority
allows the Secretary to consult with the EPA and to balance state
certification with other factors, it does not allow him to abdicate his
authority to issue permits to another federal agency. The court
agreed,'" and ordered that environmental impact statements accom-
pany all permits, thereby paralyzing the permit-issuing process.'"
The Kalur decision was not decided solely on the basis of statu-
tory construction. The petitioner argued vehemently that the permit
system itself was detrimental to the environment and urged that it be
strictly construed. The court responded affirmatively to this conten-
tion in concluding that the "permit program only hinders the effective-
ness of Congress' intent to keep our waterways clean for both naviga-
tion and environmental reasons."' Although the Corps initially
claimed that an environmental impact statement would not be required
for each of the 20,000 permit applications thus far received, 168
 it has
subsequently declared a moratorium on the issuance of all permits until
Corps regulations are changed. The Corps, however, continues to
process applications.'"
The Kalur court has similarly eviscerated the permit system by
enjoining the Corps from issuing a permit for sources discharging into
151 445 F.2d 1109 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
152 3 E.R.C. at 1466.
153 Zabel v. Tabb, 430 F.2d 199 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 910 (1971).
154 42 U.S.C. § 4334 (1970).
155 3 E.R.C. at 1467.
155 See id. at 1468.
157
 Id. at 1464.
168 See Chicago Tribune, Dec. 30, 1971, § 1 at 11, col. 4. Current regulations recog-
nize the need for an impact statement when environmental subjects other than water
are affected, but rely on assurances of the Council on Environmental Quality that the
certification procedure is sufficient in the case of water quality and related water quality
considerations. 36 Fed. Reg. 6564 at seq., § 209.131(L) (2) (1971).
152 Noted at 2 BNA Env. Rep., Current Devs. 1088 (Jan. 7, 1972).
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a nonnavigable body of water.le° Thus the scope of the permit system
has been made narrower than that of the FWPCA, which applies to
navigable waters as well as their tributaries. As a result, the need for
new legislation has become abundantly clear.
2. The Senate Approach
Initially, the Senate bill offers a solution to the problem of the
limited scope of the permit system by incorporating the system into
the FWPCA and defining navigable waters as "the navigable waters
of the United States, portions thereof, and tributaries thereof. . . 2' 1°1
Thus the bill would eliminate the jurisdictional restrictions that the
Kalur case imposed on the Refuse Act. Although the bill does not sub-
stantively change the basic approach of the permit system's method
of enforcement, certain features of existing law have been retained
and new ones have been added to insure a smooth functioning system,
consistent with the goals of pollution abatement. Those features which
have been retained include:
a) the declaration that discharges without a permit are un-
lawfu1; 182
b) the procedure by which permits are conditioned to assure
compliance with applicable water quality requirements; 188
c) the power of states to block effectively issuance of a spe-
cific permit by refusing to certify, and the waiver of that
power by failing to act within a reasonable time; 164 and
d) the issuance of all permits on the condition that they will
not degrade the quality of affected water.'"
Among the changes proposed in the Senate bill, a principal measure
would replace the Secretary of the Army Corps of Engineers with the
Administrator of the EPA.'" This measure was introduced with a view
toward improving the efficiency of the system. Since the Administrator
already administers most of the FWPCA, it is only sensible to grant
him full legal authority.
Another change proposed in the Senate bill involves restructuring
the jurisdiction of the state and federal governments under the Refuse
Act. Dealing with one of the bill's more complicated problems, the au-
thors of the bill confronted the difficult task of incorporating the per-
mit system into the FWPCA, while attempting to reconcile the powers
of the state and federal governments. Under existing laws, two separate
systems exist in a few states: (a) the Refuse Act for federal enforce-
loo 3 E.R.C. at 1468. See n.129 supra for background of prior Iaw.
161 S. 2770, § 502(h), 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971) [hereinafter cited as S. 27701.
182 Id. f 301(a).
168 Id. § 402(a)(2).
164 Id. § 401(a)(1).
186 Id. § 402(h).
166 See Id. § 402(a)(1).
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ment and (b) a state-developed permit system."' In approaching the
problem, the authors were presented with four alternatives. First, the
states could be given exclusive power to establish permit systems of
their own. Although this alternative was advocated by many,'" and
would embody the ideal expressed in the state responsibility principle,
it is questionable, in view of the states' poor performance under exist-
ing law, whether such an approach would be practical. A second alter-
native would create an exclusive federal enforcement program. This
approach would not only be contrary to the principle of state respon-
sibility, but might also be impractical. The network of state govern-
ments provides a useful framework for a permit system and should
be used if possible.'" Third, both the states and the federal govern-
ment could have concurrent enforcement powers, with the federal gov-
ernment's power conditional on a state's failure to act. This alternative
would produce some of the same problems discussed earlier in regard
to administrative action."' A final alternative would give both the states
and the federal government concurrent powers, without conditions at-
tached to the federal power. The Senate bill adopts the latter approach.
In substance, the bill provides the Administrator with unlimited
enforcement powers. However, if a state program met the statutory
requirements, the Administrator could suspend the federal program
for that state and allow the state program to continue."' If the federal
program were suspended, the state would still have to give the Admin-
istrator opportunity to review each permit application it receives.'" If
the Administrator either were satisfied with the conditions of the per-
mit or waived his right to review,. the permit could be issued.'" The
Administrator could also waive his right to review in two other situa-
tions: where a state possessed expertise regarding a category or class
of pollution sources, which the Administrator would recognize when
he approved the state program; 174 and where the Administrator pro-
mulgated new regulations which he believed would adequately cover
certain categories of sources."' Finally, if, after a public hearing, the
Administrator found that a state was not maintaining its permit pro-
gram properly, he could withdraw his approval of its system."' Thus,
although the states would be given the opportunity to participate in
the permit system, ultimate control would remain with the federal gov-
101 Sec the discussion in 2 BNA Env. Rep., Current Devs. 207 et seq. (June 25, 1971)
concerning the overlap of these two systems.
108 See, e.g., Senate Hearings, supra note 120, at 459, 596. The states' position is
well demonstrated in 2 BNA Env. Rep., Current Devs. 431 (Aug. 13, 1971).
109 Senate Hearings, supra note 120, at 555.
II° See text at pp. 765-67 supra.
111 S. 2770, § 402(b), (c) (1), note 161 supra.
172 Id. 1 402(d)(1)(2), (3).
173 See id. § 402(d)(2), (3).
174 S. Rep. No. 414, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 71 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Senate Re-
port] in reference to S. 2770, § 402(c), note 161 supra.
170 S. 2770, § 402(1), note 161 supra.
1" Id. § 402 (c) (3).
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ernment. However, this relationship constitutes one of the major sub-
jects for Nixon Administration criticism of the Senate bill.
3. The Administration's Approach
The Administration has praised the Senate bill's permit program
as "an excellent solution which accommodates the existing permit pro-
gram with the new effluent limitations."'" However, the Administration
tempered its praise by criticizing the state-federal relationship created
by the bill: "the essence of a sound Federal-State partnership in a work-
able water pollution control program is to give both levels of govern-
ment a meaningful and well defined role." 178 The Administration argues
that under the Senate bill, a state which has demonstrated the ability
to carry out its own permit system is not given a "meaningful delega-
tion" of power.'" Rather, the bill merely provides for the "imposition
of a separate layer of government between the party applying for a
permit and the government agency which issues the permit."'" This
added layer of government, the Administration urges, wastes both hu-
man and economic resources. 18" In its place, the Administration would
substitute a procedure which permits the Administrator to revoke all
or part of a state's program when necessary, thereby allowing him to
review those permits issued by the states within the ninety days pre-
ceding the revocation .182
The Administration's assessment seems erroneously to be based
on theoretical rather than practical inefficiency. In the report accom-
panying the Senate bill, its authors state:
Although the Administrator is given the authority to
review any permit before it is issued by a State, the Com-
mittee expects that, after delegation, the Administrator will
withhold his review of proposed permits which are not of ma-
jor significance."'
Thus, in practice, the Administrator would not duplicate the state ef-
forts. Instead, he would only intervene in important cases to insure
that the state is doing an adequate job. Under the Administration's
proposal the Administrator would have to wait until the state handled
a number of cases inadequately before he could revoke approval and,
hopefully, undo the harm. In short, the real issue is whether the fed-
eral government is to be given the power to act immediately when
states act irresponsibly. The Administration has advocated strong and
177 Statement of William D. Ruckelshaus, 2 BNA Env. Rep., Current Devs. 968 (Dec.
10, 1971).
178 Id.
179 Id.
188 Id.
181 Id.
182 Id.
188 Senate Report, supra note 174, at 71.
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swift federal enforcement powers.'" Its approach to this matter seems
to be totally inconsistent with the accomplishment of that objective.
C. Other Problems
In any discussion of possible improvements in water pollution
legislation, two final areas require further comment. These are the
problems of penalties and citizen participation in the enforcement pro-
cess. Although neither of these problems is as controversial as effluent
limitations or the permit system, they do play a significant role in the
area of enforcement, and involve serious questions as to the proper
role of government in an effective water pollution abatement system.
1. Penalties
The role of penalties in law enforcement in general has been the
subject of debate among legal scholars.'" One group, in adopting the
traditional view, has argued that a potential law-breaker may be de-
terred from committing a crime by the penalty attached to it; the
greater the penalty, the more deterrence there is.' 8° Critics of this the-
ory have contended that individuals do not behave rationally when
breaking the law and that the penalty is only brought to their minds
after the crime has been committed.187 This may hold true with regard
to homicides and burglaries, but it does not seem to apply in water
pollution cases.
Since most pollution is caused by industrial concerns, penalties
must be addressed to the businessmen who manage them. Normally,
businessmen act quite rationally when evaluating the water pollution
laws. Unfortunately, existing law does little to influence their decision
to violate or comply with it. Although the FWPCA affords injunctive
relief,'" it does not penalize individual acts of pollution. Thus the pol-
luter may continue to pollute throughout the process of administrative
action until he is ordered to stop by a court. He is not held account-
able for any of his violations prior to the issuance of the injunction.
Under the Refuse Act there are criminal sanctions for violators, but
the fines imposed are far less than the cost of abatement. Furthermore,
the EPA has recommended to its regional offices that these sanctions
be invoked only in cases of severe damage.'" As a result of their in-
effectiveness, these penalty provisions make neglect more profitable
than abatement.19° Clearly, legislation is needed to create the opposite
incentive.
1M See text at p. 763 supra.
188 For a general discussion see S. Kadish and M. Paulsen, Criminal Law and Its
Processes 64-94 (1969).
180 E.g., id. at 83, 84.
187 E.g., id. at 84, 85.
188 33 U.S.C.	 1160(h) (1970).
180 EPA Guidelines on Water Pollution' Enforcement, 2 BNA Env. Rep., Current
Devs. 562 (Sept. 10, 1971).
190 See Barry, The Evolution of the Enforcement Provisions of the Federal Water
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The Senate bill has responded to this need by establishing a system
of criminal and civil penalties. Those penalties which are to be as-
sessed against persons who "willfully or negligently" violate an effluent
limitation or permit, include:
a) First offense.—A criminal fine of not more than $25,000
nor less than $2,500 per day of violation, or a prison term
of not more than one year, or both.
b) Second offense.—A criminal fine of not more than $50,000
per day of violation, or a prison sentence of not more
than two years, or boih.1°1
Although its fines are substantial, the Senate bill seems to avoid the
pitfalls of laws which are simply too stringent to be enforced. Often,
because of the harshness of a law's penalty, an enforcement official
may be reluctant to prosecute a violator, and a judge, even more hesi-
tant to convict him. Although a $2,500 fine is considerably greater than
the $500 minimum requirement of the Refuse Act, 192 it does not reach
the point of diminishing enforcement returns. In fact, the bill's scope
gives a court considerable latitude to make abatement more profitable
than pollution.
There still remains, however, a problem as to the use of these
penalties. This is largely the result of a lack of an administrative fo-
rum in which the penalties may be used as bargaining chips. Although
this problem has already been discussed above, under "administrative
action,"na the point bears further mentioning here. Very little time is
given to the polluter to comply with the threat of an unprofitable pen-
alty after he has been detected.'" If the function of the law is to se-
cure compliance rather than collect fines, a valuable feature of strong
penalties is at least partially lost here since compliance will not avoid
the penalty. Moreover, the violator may, in facing the certainty of a
fine, engage in dilatory litigation in order to delay as long as possible
his payment of the fine.
The Senate bill has also added two other penal features to present
law. The first would impose a possible $10,000 criminal fine and a six
months' jail sentence for making false representations on documents,
or for tampering with monitoring devices. °5 If these penalties are ac-
tually enforced, the detection stage of an enforcement program will
be greatly strengthened. However, their effectiveness may be limited
by less than diligent observance of self-monitoring duties under the
bill.'" Similarly, the criminal sanctions placed upon individual acts of
Pollution Control Act: A Study of the Difficulty in Developing Effective Legislation, 68
Mich. L. Rev. 1103, 1121 (1970).
191 S. 2770, § 309(c) (1) (E), note 161 supra.
192 33 U.S.C. § 411 (1970).
193 See text at pp. 767-68 supra.
194 See S. 2770, § 309(2), note 161 supra.
loa Id. § 309(c) (2).
196 See note 47 supra.
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pollution may be stymied by Fifth Amendment self-incrimination re-
strictions on the use of monitoring evidence 107
The second added penalty feature is the "Federal Procurement"
provision of the bill. It provides that:
No Federal agency may enter into any contract with any
person, who has been convicted [under the enforcement pro-
vision], for the procurement of goods, materials, and ser-
vices if such contract is to be performed at any facility at
which the violation which gave rise to such conviction oc-
curred, and if such facility is owned, leased, or supervised
by such person.'"
This provision makes it clear that the federal government will not "pa-
tronize or subsidize polluters through its procurement practices. . . ." 1"
This proposal is an adaptation of a Pennsylvania procedure which re-
moves polluters from the Commonwealth's bidding and purchasing lists
until they comply with the pollution control regulations.'" The Senate
approach, however, seemingly lacks the stringency of the Pennsylvania
law. For example, a company could, under the proposed procurement
regulation, have one of its nonpolluting plants submit a bid and trans-
fer its other work to one of the company's polluting plants. However,
the report accompanying the Senate bill has specifically recognized the
possibility of this abuse and has indicated that the enforcing agency
will require the polluting plant to achieve compliance with the law
before any contract will be offered to the nonpolluting plant.'"
While stiffer penalties will provide some stimulus for change, some
questions remain as to whether violations will be detected. If there is
no guarantee of the detection, then the likelihood of few prosecutions
will encourage industry to ignore the control standards, regardless of
the possible penalties.
2. Citizen Participation
To increase the likelihood of detection, the Senate bill includes
provisions to encourage citizens' suits. Although the concept of such
suits is not nove1,202 its inclusion in the Senate bill has elicited both
praise and criticism. Proponents of this measure have argued that "the
public is clean water's best lobby." Therefore, the law should, in their
view, provide a method whereby citizens may redress the imbalance
191 Senate Hearings on S. 75, S. 192, S. 280, S. 281, S. 523, S. 573, S. 601, S. 679,
S. 927, 5. 1011, S. 1012, S. 1013, S. 1014, S. 1015, and S. 1017 Before the Subcomm, on
Air and Water Pollution of the Senate Comm. on Public Works, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. at
593 [hereinafter cited as Senate Hearings].
res S. 2770, § 508(a), note 161 supra.
199 Senate Report, supra note 174, at 83.
200 Senate Hearings, supra note 197, at 1239.
201 Senate Report, supra note 174, at 84.
202 See Comment, The Clean Air Amendments of 1970: Better Automotive Ideas
from Congress, 12 B.C. Ind. & Corn. L. Rev. 571, 612-16 (1971).
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created by the inadequate enforcement activity of government bureau-
crats?' Such a provision would aid water pollution enforcement in
two ways: 1) by enforcing the law against pollution which the govern-
ment has ignored, and 2) by pressuring enforcement officials to perform
competently.
In contrast, critics of citizen participation argue that citizen suits
would only harass government officials, produce a multiplicity of ac-
tions and encourage the exploits of self-seeking citizens. 2" Critics have
also claimed that citizens are already provided with a number of alter-
natives for individual action by existing law. 205 A brief examination
of existing law reveals, however, that the critics are in error and that,
in fact, these alternatives are limited. Under the Refuse Act, for ex-
ample, one who informs the Attorney General of an alleged permit
violation is entitled to one-half of the fine, upon conviction of the vio-
lator.2" Under the Act, the traditional suit, a qui tam action, is
"brought under a statute that establishes a penalty for the commission
or omission of a certain act and gives the penalty, in whole or part,
to anyone who sues for it." 2" To date, several of these suits have been
brought in federal district courts; all, however, have been dismissed
because of the plaintiff's lack of standing to sue?" The courts have
strictly construed the Refuse Act as permitting only the Attorney Gen-
eral to bring an action, through the U.S. Attorney, in the federal dis-
trict where the violation occurs?"
In addition, the .common law has provided citizens with several
other alternatives. For instance, a citizen owning waterfront property
may sue on a private nuisance theory if his use and enjoyment of that
property are being substantially impaired."' He may also sue on a
riparian rights theory if he can prove that the polluter has put the
water to an unreasonable use or if the court will accept the "natural-
flow" theory of recovery. 2" A citizen not owning waterfront property
203 Senate Hearings, supra note 197, at 647.
2°4 Id. at 755.
205 Id.
206 33 U.S.C. f 411 (1970).
207 Comment, The Refuse Act of 1899: Its Scope and Role in Control of Water
Pollution, 58 Calif. L. Rev. 1444, 1459 (1970). In bringing such a suit, the plaintiff pre-
sents himself to the court as a person suing for himself and the government. United States
v. Griswold, 24 F. 361 (D. Ore. 1885).
208 See, e.g., Mitchell v. Tenneco Chem., Inc., 331 F. Supp. 1031 (D.S.C. 1971);
Bass Angler Sportsmen Soc'y v. United States Steel Corp., 324 F. Supp. 412 (N.D. Ala.
1971).
200 Id.
210 See Comment, supra note 207, 58 Calif. L. Rev. at 1463; Davis, Theories of
Water Pollution Litigation, 1971 Wis. L. Rev. 738, 740-41.
211 Davis, supra note 210, at 739. The natural flow concept in riparian rights litiga-
tion gives a riparian owner a right of action against an upstream owner who changes or
alters the natural flow of the body of water upon which both owners are located. Id.
at 745-46. Because of its drastic potential effect on industry, courts are more prone to
follow the reasonable use theory of riparian rights. See id. 746. The reasonable use theory
allows an upstream riparian owner to put water to a reasonable use. Thus only in the
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is, of course, limited in water pollution cases to a cause of action for
public nuisance where he can prove special damages. 212 As a counter-
poise to these rights, agency regulations may provide four different
defenses •
1. the exclusive jurisdiction of the administrative agency
could preclude a court from hearing a common law ac-
tion;
2. compliance by the defendant with an administrative pol-
lution abatement order could bar the action;
3. failure to exhaust administrative remedies could delay the
action;
4. the rule of primary jurisdiction could bar the action.'
As the analysis suggests, critics of the citizen suit proposal and the
enforcement provisions in general are not quite accurate. Use of the
citizen suit is currently limited and if it is to be effective, it must be
bolstered as the Senate bill proposes.
The citizen suit provision within the bill authorizes a suit by
"any person" against both the polluter (including governmental agen-
cies) who has violated effluent standards, and the Administrator, if
he has failed to perform his duties." Suits against polluters could
not be commenced until sixty days after the citizen has given notice
to the Administrator, the state and potential defendant," while suits
against the Administrator could be commenced at any time after notice
has been given." The waiting period in the case of a suit against a
polluter would give the enforcement authority a chance to act on the
matter itself.' If the state or Administrator has in fact commenced
and is diligently prosecuting an action in a federal court, the citizen
could not bring his suit; he could, however, intervene in the govern-
ment's case." However, if the court decided that the state or Admin-
istrator's action was inadequate, it could still take jurisdiction over
most blatant cases of pollution can a downstream riparian owner-plaintiff ever expect to
bring a successful action. Id. at 746-47.
212 Id. at 741.
213 Id. at 768 et seq.
214 S. 2770, § 505(a) (1), (2), 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971) [hereinafter cited as
S. 2770]. Jurisdiction and venue are important considerations. Although district courts
are given jurisdiction over these actions without regard to the citizenship of the parties
or the amount in question, id. § 505(a), venue in effluent standards cases is restricted
to the district in which the violating source is located. Id. 505(c)(1). Thus, if a
number of suits were brought against the same source, they could be joined under the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See, Senate Hearings, supra note 197, at 699; see also
Fed. R. Civ. P. 19.
216 S. 2770, § 505(b)(1)(A), note 214 supra.
216 Id. 11 505(b)(2).
217 Senate Report, supra note 174, at 80.
218 S. 2770, § 505(b)(1)(B), not;: 214 supra.
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the citizen's case; 216
 but the Administrator would have the right to
intervene.22°
A citizen could base his cause of action on violations of effluent
limitations. If a violation existed, the court could apply a civil pen-
alty.22' However, the citizen who brings the suit would not be entitled
to any part of the penalty. 222 If he has suffered personal damages, the
provision would allow him to sue by himself or in a class action under
any other statute or the common law.228 Apparently, these latter pro-
visions are meant to discourage those self-seeking citizens of whom
the critics warned. An additional safeguard is included in the bill to
insulate individuals and businesses from spurious claims: the court
would be given the authority to award court costs. 224 This provision
would protect defendants from frivolous suits and would also reim-
burse plaintiffs who win their cases by judgment when the polluter
has since ceased his polluting. 228 In large measure, the Senate bill's
citizens' suit provision withstands the criticism of its opponents. Citi-
zens would be given the right to act where the system has failed them,
and at the same time, their activity is structured in such a manner
as to improve, rather than impede, the enforcement system.
CONCLUSION
In 1948 Congress, for the first time, directed serious attention
toward the problem of water pollution by enacting the Federal Water
Pollution Control Act. In spite of the salutary intention of this legis-
lation, the problems of water pollution continued to proliferate. Thus
on several subsequent occasions Congress attempted to respond by
enacting a series of subsequent amendments. Present law, particularly
in the area of enforcement, continues, however, to be less than ade-
quate. Among other factors, cumbersome standards, overly complex
administrative procedures and the lack of a clear-cut separation of
federal-state enforcement powers have significantly limited the effec-
tiveness of these legislative attempts to abate water pollution.
Not surprisingly, a broad range of answers has been suggested
to solve the numerous problems inhering in existing water pollution
enforcement procedures. Senate bill S. 2770 represents an attempt to
deal with these problems by proposing a radically novel legislative
schema of answers. The bill provides for (a) the use of the effluent
limitation as the standard for enforcement, with due consideration
216 Senate Report, supra note 174, at 80. The bill also provides that a Governor of
a state may bring an action against the Administrator where he finds that the Adminis-
trator has failed to enforce a violation of an effluent standard in another state which is
adversely affecting his own. S. 2770, § 505(g), note 214 supra.
220 Id. § 505(c)(2).
221 Id. § 505(a).
222 Senate Report, supra note 174, at 74.
223 S. 2770, 505(e), note 214 supra.
224 Id. § 505(d).
226 S. Rep. No. 414, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 81 (1971).
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given to its ultimate water quality impact; (b) a speedy and more
efficient administrative enforcement procedure; (c) the incorporation
of the discharge permit system into the Federal Water Pollution Con-
trol Act; (d) the introduction of both strong penalties and citizen suits
into the enforcement process; and (e) the establishment of a sounder
balance of state-federal enforcement powers throughout the entire en-
forcement process. Although these provisions individually have failed
to gain unanimous approval, as a whole they constitute the most op-
erative alternative to existing law.
Equally important, the Senate bill indicates a new attitude on the
part of legislators toward effective water pollution abatement; the pro-
posed legislation evidences a necessary willingness on their part to ex-
periment with new concepts, such as effluent limitations and strong
federal enforcement. However, in order to be successful, this attitude
must be implemented and sustained. Furthermore, if today's proposal
should become tomorrow's failure, it should also be abandoned for the
sake of the viable alternative.
HENRY R. HOPPER
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